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ABSTRACT 
It was almost 10 years ago that Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki 
Moon described climate change as the 'defining challenge of our age'. His 
comments came at a time when international attention centred around the Kyoto 
Protocol and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
While important, the failure of Kyoto and the UNFCCC to engage key emitters 
such as China and the U.S has significantly hindered their perceived credibility. 
The target sets by these negotiations have also attracted criticism, a result of 
attempts to balance voluntary participation with unenforceable targets. Such 
criticisms of international efforts have begged the question as to the role of 
nation states in efforts to address climate change. 
Since the time Ban Ki Moon made his comments, Australia has become the first 
country in the world to implement and repeal an emissions trading scheme. This 
is indicative of the on-going tensions between an economy dependent on fossil 
fuels and the growing public concerns with its government's inaction: a similar 
situation to many emissions intensive economies. 
In the face of international and domestic shortcomings a new 
decentralized approach has been advocated. Unlike its predecessors, this 
approach does not present a single solution, but instead calls upon those 
concerned to effect change locally. 
  
  
 
The result of such an approach can be seen in many forms, from litigation in the 
courts to adaptive approaches in local government. Key to these approaches is 
an underlying ethos, a movement which focuses not on a destination but 
direction. This direction is change. 
As the world accepts the realities of our changing climate, so to must we adapt 
the manner in which we approach it. Western Australia is no exception.  This 
paper will present the limited right to review government decisions as an existing 
issue which requires change in order to meet the challenges of climate change. 
Central to this argument is the need to engage local stakeholders, increase 
scrutiny of government decisions, develop climate jurisprudence and begin a 
response to climate change from the bottom up.  It is in this way that climate 
change is the catalyst for reviewing appeal rights in Western Australia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The environmental protection legislation in Western Australia and the Act 
potentially capable of mitigating Greenhouse Gas (‘GHG’) emissions is the 
Environmental Protect Act1 (‘EP Act’). Whilst the EP Act was not enacted to deal 
with problems of the complexity of climate change, consideration of GHG 
emissions is possible through the Act’s existing Environmental Impact 
Assessment (‘EIA’) mechanism under Part IV of the Act.  
Given Western Australia’s wealth of natural resources, the state government has 
historically retained significant control over projects seeking their exploitation. 
This control is evident in the EIA Process, which culminates in a decision being 
made by the Minister for the Environment (‘the Minister’), in consultation with 
other Ministers.   
This Government control is also extended to the environmental appeals process by 
which options of merit review are determined by the Minister rather than a 
judicial body or tribunal. This paper will examine existing criticism of this 
process and further the argument in favour its amendment.  
Central to this paper’s argument is the added complexity climate change 
contributes to decision making. It is argued that incorporating the principles of 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (‘ESD’) is essential to improving 
                                                
1 Environmental Protection Act 1986  (WA).  
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environmental and climate change related outcomes in decisions making, 
including the consideration of GHG emissions in the EIA process.  
Without the right to an effective merit review, the ability to scrutinise decisions in 
line with ecologically sustainable development principles is limited. This not only 
hinders the effectiveness of the EIA process, but also the inclusion of climate 
change factors in decisions making.  Efforts to address climate change in Western 
Australia then hinge on improving the access to appeal. Accordingly, it is the 
position of this paper that climate change is the catalyst for reforming the appeal 
provisions of the EP Act.  
Part II begins with an introduction to Environmental Impact Assessment and the 
principles of Ecologically Sustainable Development. The current process of merit 
appeal will be explained, including the processes followed by the Appeal 
Convenor. This part will then examine access to judicial review before exploring 
the common law rules of standing and how they hinder public interest litigation.  
Key criticisms of the merit appeal process will then be examined, including the 
dual role of the Minister and the perception of bias that this creates. The lack of 
procedural guidance placed on the Appeal Convenor and how the current process 
creates the perception of a breach of natural justice will also be discussed. Finally, 
the current Appeal Convenor model will be examined, specifically in relation to 
its inhibiting the development on environmental and climate jurisprudence. 
Part III examines current international literature on climate change and seeks to 
place the recommended right of appeal within the direction of these works. This 
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includes an introduction to Rayner’s ‘bottom up’ approach to climate change and 
its implications for Rittel and Weber’s ‘wicked’ and ‘tame’ dichotomy. It is 
acknowledged that this is only one of many mechanisms needed to effectively 
bring about a reduction in GHG emissions, however it is an essential one due to 
the nature of climate change and the difficulties it poses to traditional 
environmental governance.  
Public participation will then be examined and its importance to improving 
decision making. It is argued that an effective appeal process improves decisions 
making by increasing scrutiny on decisions and doing so in a ‘bottom up’ manner 
as advocated in the Part II.  
The role of climate change litigation is introduced and it is argued that an 
adequate right to review would enable the principles of ESD to be implemented 
more rigorously into decision making. Litigation is also presented as a forum of 
public participation and the important role of the court in re-interpreting existing 
environmental legislation is discussed. 
Part IV will build upon the arguments of the previous section by providing an 
account of relevant climate change litigation. This begins with an outline of cases 
which have developed ESD in Australia and then those which have incorporated 
ESD into a climate change context. Litigation’s development of issues 
surrounding causation, cumulative and indirect impacts will then be discussed as 
well as key cases which have had a regulatory impact on GHG emissions. 
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Finally, this section will examine planning decisions of the State Administrative 
Tribunal (‘SAT’). This will include an introduction to the Planning and 
Development Act 2005 (WA) (‘PD Act’) and then provide an account of 
environmental considerations being included in planning decision making. It is 
argued that these considerations provide the scope for climate change to be 
considered in planning decisions and support the argument in favour of the SAT 
hearing environmental disputes. An example of the SAT’s consideration of 
climate change is also discussed to support this argument. 
Finally, Part V will examine three ‘lightest’ to ‘heaviest’ options for 
implementing appeal rights in Western Australia. The first of these focuses on 
improving the current Appeal Convenor model. It is argued that placing 
procedural requirements on the process would encourage collective mediations 
and address existing issues related to apprehension of bias and breaches of natural 
justice. It is also suggested that the role of Appeal Convenor should be appointed 
to a current or retired legal practitioner so as to encourage independence from the 
government. 
The second of these options will look at assigning responsibility of appeal to the 
SAT. It is suggested that there are two avenues worth considering, firstly an 
ultimate right of appeal in relation to the contents of the EPA report to the 
Minister. This would address criticisms surrounding the dual role of the Minister 
and that appeal decisions are often merely precursors to the decisions of cabinet 
made in the s 45 process. 
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The second avenue will examine incorporating within the EP Act a ‘call in’ power 
similar to that within the PD Act. This would enable the SAT to hear decisions 
and make a final recommendation to the Minister for consideration. Such an 
option would address criticisms related to procedural fairness and the 
independence of the Appeal Convenor from the Government. It would also allow 
for the creation of precedent around climate change matters and the development 
of ESD in the EP Act decisions.  
The last option will examine the incorporation of an environmental court similar 
to that of the New South Wales Land and Environment Court (‘LEC’). It is noted 
this is an unlikely eventuation, however the benefits of such a court are presented. 
This section is concluded in favour of assigning responsibility of appeal to the 
SAT due to its being a compromise between the three options presented. This 
would address many of the criticisms raised whilst allowing government to retain 
significant decisions making sovereignty.  
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II. WESTERN AUSTRALIA: AN APPALLING STATE OF APPEALS 
This Part will explain the operation of Environmental Impact Assessment in 
Western Australia and how by insisting on the incorporation of ESD principles, 
this process can be used to facilitate the regulation of GHG emissions. The limited 
availability of appeal will then be examined to highlight how this restricts the 
ability of the EIA process to incorporate ESD principles and accordingly limits 
the EIA processes’ ability to consider GHG emissions.  
1. Environmental Impact Assessment in Western Australia 
This section provides a brief outline of the steps involved in the EIA process to 
understand how the EIA mechanism operates in Western Australia. The 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) describes the EIA process as:  
A predictive tool that is systematically applied at the early planning and design 
stages of development proposals so that government and community can form a 
view about a proposal’s environmental acceptability and what conditions, if any, 
should be applied to control potential risks and impacts.2 
Part IV of the EP Act sets out the framework for the EIA process and is central to 
the approvals process for large developments of the state. All proposals for major 
projects are required to be referred to the EPA for assessment. This occurs before 
any decision made by the Minister. Section 38 of the Act functions as a trigger 
                                                
2 Environmental Protection Authority Western Australia, Review of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Process in Western Australia , (March 2009) Environmental Protection Authority < 
http://www.epa.wa.gov.au/abouttheepa/eiareview/Pages/default.aspx>. 
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for proposals considered to be ‘significant proposals’. 3 A significant proposal is 
one that ‘appears likely, if implemented, to have a significant effect on the 
environment’.4 
Any person may refer a significant proposal to the EPA.5 Generally proponents 
refer their projects voluntarily, however it is mandatory for decision making 
authorities to refer significant matters that are not already referred to the EPA.6 
Once a proposal has been referred, the EPA decides whether to assess it and what 
level of assessment is required.7 Currently there are five levels of assessment 
established by the EPA, depending on the likely impact of the proposal.8 The 
greater the likely impact on the environment, the greater the involvement of the 
public in the process.9 
Following the assessment, the EPA prepares a report for the Minister 
highlighting key environmental factors to consider in assessing the proposal (‘the 
Report’). Only environmental factors can be considered by the EPA in the Report 
and it is purely an informative document that does not bind the decision maker.10 
The Report is then given to the Minister who publishes it and makes it available 
for public comment.  
                                                
3 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 38.  
4 Ibid s 37 B. 
5 Ibid s 38(1). 
6 Ibid ss 38(5), s38(5j). 
7 Ibid ss 39A, 40(2), 40(3).  
8 Environmental Protection Authority, Environmental Impact Assessment (Part IV, Divisions I) 
Administrative procedures 2012, No 223, 7 December 2012, p10. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Coastal Waters Alliance of Western Australia Incorporated v Environmental Protection 
Authority; Ex parte Coastal Waters Alliance (1996) 90 LGERA 136, 152. 
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Following the publication and engagement with the public, the environment 
Minister is required to meet with any relevant decision making authorities to 
determine conditions required for implementation of the proposal, this is known 
as the ‘Section 45 process’. 11  Upon agreement of implementation, the 
Environment Minister issues a ministerial statement verifying the approval of the 
proposal.12 If an agreement cannot be reached, the matter is referred to the 
Governor General to decide.13 If an agreement cannot be reached with relevant 
parties who are not ministers, the issue is referred to an Appeal Committee for 
resolution.14  
Accordingly, the Section 45 process involves a decision by the Environment 
Minister with consideration of the EPA’s recommendations, as well as other 
Ministers who present considerations relevant to their portfolio. The involving of 
other decision making authorities is seen as essential for consideration of 
proposals which have not only environmental but social and economic factors for 
consideration. This creates incentives for the state to approve the proposal on 
grounds of employment and government royalties and is the basis for arguments 
in favour of government retaining decision making sovereignty for proposals 
under the EIA process.15  
                                                
11 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 45(1). 
12 Ibid s 45(5). 
13 Ibid s 45(2). 
14 Ibid s 45(3). 
15 Peter Johnston, ‘Environmental Advocacy: The Role of Lawyers in Western Australia’ (1991) 8 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal (June) 158-68, 165.  
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2. Incorporating Ecologically Sustainable Development 
By its nature, environmental decisions making requires the balancing of 
economic, environmental and social interests.16 It is for this reason that the 
principles of Ecologically Sustainable Development have been developed to 
ensure environmental values are adequately considered in the decision making 
process. The application of these principles to decision making in Western 
Australia is essential in a meaningful response to climate change. It is through 
applying ESD principles to the decision making under the EIA process that other 
jurisdictions such as New South Wales and the United States have prompted the 
partial regulation of GHG emissions (discussed below). 
 First recognised in the Bruntland report and delivered at the United Nations 
World Commission on Environment and Development, ESD is defined as 
‘development which aims to meet the needs of Australians today, while 
conserving our ecosystems for the benefit of future generations.’17 Since their 
conception in the early 1990s, ESD has animated much of environmental law in 
Australia and form the objectives of many environmental statues in the county.18  
Originally used to assist decision makers balance competing interests in 
environmental disputes, ESD has assumed a new significance in the context of 
                                                
16 Ibid 160. 
17 Ecologically Sustainable Development Steering Committee, National Strategy for Ecologically 
Sustainable Development (3 December 1992) Australian Government Department of Environment 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/about-us/esd/publications/national-esd-strategy>  
18 Jacqueline Peel, ‘Climate Change Law: The Emergence of a New Legal Discipline’ (2008) 
32(3) Melbourne University Law Review 58, 962. 
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climate change litigation.19 Most relevant has been the need to consider the 
interests of future generations in making decisions that affect environmental 
resources (the ‘principle of intergenerational equity’) and the directive not to 
postpone measures to prevent harm where threats of serious or irreversible 
environmental damage exists simple on the basis of scientific uncertainty (‘the 
precautionary principle’).20 Due to the links between the purported harms of 
climate change and the intention of ESD, they have provided an excellent basis 
for challenging decision made without adequate consideration of climate change 
and its effects. 
The following section then will outline the limited availability to appeal decision 
making under the EIA process and how this limits the ability to develop 
regulatory approaches to GHG emissions. 
  
                                                
19 Gerry Bates, Environmental Law in Australia (Butterworths, 8th ed, 2013) 715.   
20 Commonwealth, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment (1992) s 3.5; Peel, above n 
18, 954. 
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3. Part VII Merit Appeal per the Environmental Protection Act 
The following analysis sets out the appeal process under Part VII of the EP Act. 
Key criticisms of the existing process will then be examined and their impact on 
facilitating the regulation of GHG emissions.     
Merit appeal involves an adjudicating body conducting a de novo hearing to 
access the appropriateness of the original decision. 21 A court approaches this 
role not as a judicial body but rather an administrative one and are able to re-
make the original decision being challenged based on its merits.22 In doing so the 
court may admit fresh evidence and approach the case in a flexible manner in 
which the rules of evidence to not apply.23  
Part VII appeals can be grouped into the following categories;  
1. Appeals of regulatory decisions made by the Chief Executive Officer of 
the Department of Environmental Regulation. These include decisions 
under Part V of the EP Act to grant or refuse licences, works approvals, 
native vegetation clearing permits, pollution control orders and the like; 
and 
                                                
21 Brian Preston, ‘Limits of Environmental Dispute Resolution Mechanisms’ (1995) 13 Australian 
Bar Review 13, 148-176, 150. 
22 Bates, above n 19, 190. 
23 Leslie A Stein, Principles of Planning Law (Oxford University Press, 2008)  265. 
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2. Appeals of decisions and recommendations by the EPA and decisions of 
the Environment Minister in respect to the EIA process conducted under 
Part IV of the EP Act.24 
It is the second of these categories related to EIA which is the focus of the 
remainder of this section.  
1. Appeals to the Environmental Impact Assessment Process 
Merit review is available for the proponent and third parties with relation to,25 
a) a decision of the EPA not to assess the proposal;26 
b) the level of assessment set by the EPA for a proposal;27 and 
c) the content of, or any recommendations in, an EPA Report prepared 
following an EIA.28  
Proponents also have the ability to appeal the conditions or procedures imposed 
by the Minister in a Ministerial Statement.29 In this circumstance, the Minister is 
required to make a decision in accordance with the recommendation of an appeal 
committee. 30  The Minister is however responsible for appointing the 
committee.31 
                                                
24 Declan Doherty, ‘Caesar to Caesar: The Merits of Western Australia’s Environmental Appeals 
Regime, (2010)  29 Australian Resource and Energy Law Journal 110, 114.  
25 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 100.  
26 Ibid s 100 (1)(a). 
27 Ibid s 100(1)(b). 
28 Ibid s 100 (1)(d). 
29 Ibid s 100(3). 
30 Ibid ss 100(1a), 106(2), 109.  
31 ibid s 106(2). 
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All three of these options are important in ensuring environmental values are 
considered in the decision making process. It is however the contents of the EPA 
Report, which informs the Minister’s decision, that are relevant to this paper’s 
discussion. The application of ESD principles has in some jurisdictions resulted 
in the inclusion of GHG emissions in equivalent reports and this has in turn had 
impacts on GHG regulation. This point will be returned to below in further detail.  
2. The Appeal Convenor as a Form of Merit Review 
The Appeal Convenor undertakes the task of processing appeals, dealing with 
parties, attempting to narrow issues and generally considering the merit of 
contentions.32 This does not detract from the Minister maintaining the ultimate 
responsibility for determining appeals under Part VII. The Appeal Convenor’s 
main functions are to advise the Minister on appeal matters.33 This is done by the 
Convenor providing a report outlining their findings and making 
recommendations regarding the appeal.34 
The Appeal Convenor enjoys considerable discretion and flexibility in 
performing his or her duties. Provided there is consultation with the EPA and the 
Appellant, the obligation to liaise with other affected parties is completely to the 
Convenor’s discretion.35 Beyond this there is little in the EP Act to prescribe 
procedures which the Appeal Convenor should follow. In the event the Convenor 
is not technically competent, the Minister may also elect to appoint an appeal 
                                                
32 Ibid s 107A.  
33 Ibid s 1007B(1)(a). 
34 Ibid s 109(3). 
35 Ibid ss 109(1), 107B. 
 14 
 
committee.36 This is often politically preferable for dispute with significant 
public interest. 
Having received the Appeal Convenors report, the Minister for Environment is 
required to make the final decision either;  
a) In accordance with the recommendations of the Appeals Committee if the 
appeal is from a decisions of the Environment Minister;37 or  
b) Having regard to the Appeal Convenors recommendations if the appeal is 
not from a decision of the Minister.38 
  
                                                
36 Ibid s 106(2)(a). 
37 Ibid ss 106(2)(b), 109(3). 
38 Ibid s 109(3)(b). 
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4. Criticisms of the Appeal Provision in the Environmental Protection Act 
The inadequacy of Western Australia’s right to appeal decisions under the EP Act 
has a long history of criticism.39 This section will examine these criticisms and 
their implications for addressing climate change. 
Most recently, Declan Doherty outlined the need for reforming Part VII appeal in 
his article ‘Caesar to Caesar: The Merit of Western Australia’s Environmental 
Appeal Regime.’40 Doherty argues that despite the historical justification for the 
government retaining decision making sovereignty in relation to large natural 
resource based projects, reforming the appeal provisions could improve decision 
making and public confidence in the process without significantly diminishing 
Government control.41  Central to Doherty’s argument is that the Part VII appeal 
system creates perceived and or potential breaches of natural justice.42 
Doherty’s arguments are relevant to this paper as they highlight existing 
limitations in the appeal process. It is worth elaborating on some of Doherty’s 
points as they provide a foundation from which this paper will develop the 
argument for reform in line with the unique challenges and characteristics of 
climate change.  
                                                
39 Johntson, above n 15; Doherty, above n 24.  
40Doherty, above n 24, 110. 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid 117. 
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1. An Appeal from Caesar to Caesar 
The primary criticism that Doherty highlights is with the contradictory roles the 
Minister plays within the Appeal process.43These roles include the Minister 
determining the composition of the Appeals Committee, even when the appeal is 
against the Minister’s decision.44 Also, the Minister is responsible for appointing 
the members of the EPA as well as determining any appeals on their behalf. 
Further, the role of Appeals Convenor has historically been a former member of 
the Department of Environmental Regulation, which also provides information to 
the Appeals Convenor and EPA when making their decisions in the appeals 
process.45  
Most importantly however is the Minister’s role to determine the outcome of the 
Section 45 process. The key issue being that this often occurs after determining 
any point of appeal from the EIA process and specifically, the contents of the 
EPA report. 46  Doherty comments that this has resulted in the appeals 
determination being perceived as a ‘precursor’ to the final decision.47  
This point is particularly relevant to this paper’s analysis. Currently measures to 
address GHG emissions have been attempted by insisting on their inclusion as an 
environmental consideration in the EPA’s Report to the Minister. 
                                                
43 Ibid; Peter Johnston, ‘A discussion Paper on the Appeals System under the Environmental 
Protection Act’, EPA Western Australia Bulletin 540,  June 1991, 1.  
44 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 106(2)(b). 
45 Doherty, above n24, 118.  
46 As noted above this involves the publication of the EPA’s report and public consultation, after 
which the Minister meets with relevant decisions making authorities to determine conditions 
required for the proposal’s implementation. 
47 Doherty, above n24, 118. 
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The conflict arises out of the fact that in determining appeals to the EPA’s report, 
the Minister is bound to only consider environmental factors, however following 
the resolution of appeals, the Minister is then also required to participate in the 
political process and make a decision with consideration of a full spectrum of 
economic and social factors.  
The perceived economic benefits from large projects naturally present and strong 
incentive for approval and the Minister’s ability to impartially consider solely 
environmental factors in the EIA appeal process is questionable. Further and 
significantly, fellow Ministers considering benefits to their portfolios may over 
rule the consideration of environmental factors by the Environment Minister 
during the Section 45 process.  
An example of this followed the Environment Minister Donna Faragher’s appeal 
determination of an EPA Report regarding the Gorgon liquefied natural gas 
project on Barrow Island.48 The West Australian Newspaper reported that the 
cabinet had ‘trampled’ over her in considering appeals based on environmental 
factors including on the flat-backed turtle.49 This led to comments by the World 
Wildlife Fund that  
                                                
48 Hon Donna Faragher JP MLC, Minister for the Environment, ‘Minister’s Appeal Determination, 
Appeals Against Report and Recommendations – Reviews and Expanded Gorgon Gas Project’, 
Barrow Island Report 1323, Chevron Australia Pty Ltd, 29 July 2009. 
49 Paul Murray, ‘Stage Set for Slashing of Green and Red Tape’, West Australian Newspaper, 
(Perth), August 2009. 
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It is very clear the Environment Minister’s comments [in the Appeal] are a 
precursor to an approval for the Gorgon Project, which we believe is a substantial 
threat to one of Western Australia’s most important environmental icons.50 
It is the very nature of Minister’s dual role through this process which Doherty 
suggests leaves him or her open to criticism that her decision was not made 
lawfully.51 This is particularly true for challenges made to the EPA’s report to the 
Minister, per the example above, as it is a requirement of s 45(6) that the proposal 
to which the report addresses must not be implemented otherwise than in 
accordance with the decision made on the appeal of the report.52 This has the 
result of undermining appeals to the EPA report, as the appeal is then decided in 
accordance with the decisions of the Government.  
This feature of the EP Act was described as ‘strange’ by Justice Rowland in the 
Coastal Waters Case53 when he stated 
I have some difficulty in understanding how s 45(5) works in practice when there 
are differences between Ministers or other decisions making authorities. It appears 
that, even after the appeal process under s100 is completed and a decision made, 
the process of resolving differences between Ministers and other decisions making 
authorities has to be agreed or decided; but insofar as other Ministers or decisions 
                                                
50  ABC News, WWF Outraged by 50b Gorgon Project, (30 July 2009) < 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-07-30/wwf-outraged-by-50b-gorgon-project/1372008> 
51 Doherty, above n 24, 119. 
52 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 45(6)(a)(ii).   
53 Coastal Waters Alliance of Western Australia Incorporated v Environmental Protection 
Authority; Ex parte Coastal Waters Alliance (1996) 90 LGERA 136. 
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making authorities are concerned, they will be bound by the decisions of the 
Minister pursuant to s 45(6)(a).54 
The process brings into question the effectiveness of the EIA process in Western 
Australia to adequately balance competing interests in environmental decisions 
making. As explained above, environmental considerations often conflict with the 
economic benefits of natural resource projects and in a State dependent on such 
projects there is an inherent risk that government decision makers fail to 
adequately consider and mitigate environmental harms.  
This problem is exacerbated in the context of climate change. As GHG emissions 
do not meet the ‘significance’ threshold prescribed by the EIA process55, their 
weight as an environmental concern to be considered in decision making for new 
projects and proposals is non-existent. Further, the ability to insist on the 
inclusion of GHG emissions in the EPA report to the Minister is unlikely to be 
successful, as the Minister will be required to discard this advice in making the 
final decision. It is evident how this is a politically undesirable position and 
unlikely it is to eventuate considering the consultation process with other 
Ministers in the section 45 process outlined above.   
 
                                                
54 Ibid 7 per Rowland J. 
55 Issues surrounding ‘significance’ are addressed under Part IV(D)(i). 
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2. Risk of Breach of Natural Justice 
Doherty argues that the second key weakness in Western Australia’s merit review 
system is the lack of procedural guidance placed on the Appeal Convenor (‘the 
Convenor’).  
Section 107D of the EP Act grants the Convenor the power to manage 
administrative procedures with relation to appeal.56 Doherty points out that the 
‘Administrative Procedures’ page on the Appeal Convenor’s webpage provides 
little assistance beyond summarising the broad discretion granted under Part VII 
of the EP Act.57 Further, these procedures ‘have never been gazetted and approved 
by the Environment Minister as contemplated by s 107D’.58 
Key to Doherty’s criticism is that the manner in which the appeal takes place is 
often secretive and creates distrust. Behaviour which has led to this criticism 
includes the rarity of mediations, which are substituted by the Convenor meeting 
with each party privately and separately, and the Convenor taking advice from the 
EPA and Department of Environmental Regulation without providing a copy of 
this advice to parties even upon request. 59 Insisting on an approach which relies 
upon the Convenor’s staff to accurately relay messages from the parties rather 
                                                
56 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 107D. 
57 Doherty, above n 24, 120. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Urban Development Institute of WA, ‘The Environmental Approvals process – Presentations 
and Speaking Notes by Debra Goostrey, UDIA WA ‘, Review of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Process in Western Australia; Doherty, above n 24, 120. 
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than collaboratively meet, Doherty argues, hinders the objective of transparency 
and leaves the parties uncertain as to how the final decision reached.60  
An example of these practices is the Tutunup South Mineral Sands Project, in 
which a total of nine appeals were raised against the EPA’s Report recommending 
approval.61 The Appeal Convenor’s report for that appeal reflects conduct at issue 
described above and the following passage reflects this; 
A representative of the office of the Appeal Convenor held discussions with the 
proponent and appellants during the investigation. This included a site visit and 
meetings with a number of the appellants in Busselton.’(Emphasis added)62  
This statement suggests that not all parties were involved in the site visit nor if 
the EPA advice referred to as the ‘investigation’ was made available to all parties, 
nor if they were given the opportunity to comment on them let alone discuss the 
recommendations with the EPA themselves. It is clear then how these 
circumstances can lead to affected parties treating the process with suspicion and 
criticisms that such a process is a breach of natural justice.63  
This process is inadequate as the discretion placed on the Convenor coupled with 
the fact the Convenor is appointed by the Minister suggests the inclusion of GHG 
emission in the EPA report are unlikely to be adequately considered. 
                                                
60 Ibid. 
61 Appeals Convenor, Report 1308 Appeals 004-012 of 2009 (May 2009), 
<www.appealsconvenor.wa.gov.au>.   
62Ibid p4. 
63 Gary Myers, ‘Meeting Public Expectations – Judicial Review of Environmental Impact 
Statements in the United States: Lessons for Reform in Western Australia?’ 3(2) Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law 18; Doherty, above n 24, 120. 
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Central to the argument of this paper is that given the limitations of Part VII 
appeals, the responsibility for conducting appeals should be assigned to an 
independent court or tribunal. Given the lack of transparency in the current 
appeals process and the political discomfort with imposing the consideration of 
GHG emissions in the EIA process, assigning the responsibility of determining 
merit appeal to a judicial body or tribunal is necessary. This would ensure that 
decision makers consider the principles of ESD and with it GHG emissions, in 
the EIA process. It is by facilitating this process that Western Australia can begin 
to develop a response to climate change within the EIA decisions making process.  
3. Judicial Review 
Given the lack of transparency and potential for the Part VII process to breach the 
rules of natural justice, it is reasonable for parties to consider decisions reached 
through the Section 45 process and Appeal Convenor processes unlawful. 
Accordingly the next section then will examine the available of judicial review in 
Western Australia as the natural recourse for challenging the legality of decisions.  
Judicial review involves the court assessing if a government decisions was made 
accordingly to the relevant legislation and common law rules of procedural 
fairness and natural justice.64  The court is not however permitted to assess the 
merit of decisions unless an appellant can demonstrate an inherent bias or 
                                                
64 Judith Bannister, Gabrielle Appleby & Anna Olijnyk, ‘Government Accountability Australian 
Administrative Law’, (Cambridge University press, 1st ed) Part IV Judicial review at 352. 
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unreasonableness which infringes on the procedural requirements of the decision 
making process.65 The later of these options is exceptionally difficult to satisfy.66  
The EP Act makes it clear that all decisions under Part VII are final and without 
further appeal.67 This means parties seeking administrative relief are required to 
meet the test established at common law.68  This can be brought to the Supreme 
Court under its inherent jurisdiction to grant prerogative remedies such as 
injunctions and declarations, however the reliance on common law standards of 
standing is a significant barrier for public interest litigants. 
To establish standing under the common law, it must be shown that the person 
bringing the action has a ‘special interest’ in the subject matter over and above 
that enjoyed by the public generally’.69 This is particularly difficult in the context 
of environmental law as often the action involves enforcing a public right.70  
This is also true for cases brought in the context of climate change. Given the 
uncertainty that specific emissions from a project will have on the global 
phenomenon that is climate change, it is difficult for parties to establish a ‘special 
interest’ above other members of the public as prescribed by the common law.71  
                                                
65 Ibid 354. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) ss 101(1), 107(2), 109(3).  
68 Bannister, above n 63, 352; H Schoombie and L McIntosh, Watching over the Watch-Dogs: 
Regulatory theory and Practice with Particular Reference to Environmental Regulation, 
Environmental Defender’s Office WA (October 2002) Environmental Defenders Office, 
<http://www.edowa.org.au/files/articles/8_Watchdogs.pdf>. 
69 Ibid; Bannister, above n 63, 352. 
70 Suzanne Rigney, ‘The Role of Procedural Fairness and Ultra Vires in the Judicial Review of 
Environmental Disputes’ (1993) 10 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 148, 151. 
71 Brian Preston, ‘Climate Change in the Courts’ (2010), 36 Monash University Law Review 16, 
18; Brian Preston, ‘Climate Change Litigation’, (2009) 9 The Judicial Review 205,  220. 
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An example of the West Australian Supreme Courts approach to standing is 
evidenced in the case of Ex parte Leeuwin Conservation Group.72 In that case 
Justice Wheeler was required to consider whether an environmental group 
established some ten years prior to the case and with members whose land was 
within the close proximity of the proposed subdivision had sufficient standing to 
oppose the subdivision.  
She noted the ‘longstanding difficulty in defining what, if any, standing 
requirements exist… in defining the relationship…between the particular interest 
of the applicant for the remedy sough [in judicial review] and the courts 
discretion to grant it’.73  
She ultimately denied the Leeuwin group’s application for standing on account of 
their failure to establish a real interest in the land in question.74 This was despite 
the group being formed for the purpose of protecting the environment of which 
the subdivision would impact, as well as their participation in the environmental 
consultation process.75 
The case is potentially distinguishable on account of it being made under the PD 
Act 76 and the land in question being private land. This would arguably require 
the group to establish a higher level of interest on account of their interfering with 
a private right.  
                                                
72 Re Western Australian Planning Commissions; Ex parte Leeuwin Conservation Group (2002) 
WASCA 150.    
73 Ibid 21. 
74 Re Western Australian Planning Commissions; Ex parte Leeuwin conservation Group (2002) 
WASCA 150, 22. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA). 
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The PD Act is however required to promote the sustainable use and development 
of land, a similar requirement to ESD under the EP Act.77 SAT decisions with 
respect to the PD Act will be considered in more detail later in this paper. 
It is also possible that the court’s resistance to afford the potential remedy of 
certiorari as requested in the Leeuwin case is due to its view that judicial review 
requires a higher degree of administrative error to justify such remedies78. This 
does however support arguments in favour of amending Western Australia’s 
merit review system, as presently parties are unable to find relief within the 
provisions of part VII or within the common law of judicial review.     
It is also worth mentioning here that the limited approach to standing is not 
reflected in all other States in Australia. NSW for example has open standing 
provisions which apply to ‘any person, without exception.79 The impact this has 
had on efforts to regulate GHG emission can be seen in cases such as Gray v 
Minister for Planning80 and Australian Conservation Foundation v Latrobe City 
Council.81 These cases and their impact on climate change regulation will be 
discussed in further detail below, however for present purposes it is suffice to say 
that the availability of judicial review is essential for developing the law.  
                                                
77 Ibid s 3.  
78 Bannister, above n 63, 352. 
79 Environmental and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) s 123. 
80 (2006) 152 LGERA 258. 
81 Australian Conservation Foundation v Latrobe City Council (2004) 140 LGERA 100. 
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4. Environmental and Climate Change Jurisprudence 
The final criticism this section will consider is the lack of environmental 
jurisprudence developed in Western Australia as a result of the Appeal Convenor 
system.  
The availability of the Appeal Convenor’s recommendation to the Environment 
Minister and the Minister’s Decisions are both published on the Appeal 
Convenor’s Website.82 These decisions however are not encompassed by the 
doctrine of precedent.83 
Doherty is critical of the fact these decisions are clearly drafted by the Appeal’s 
Convenor’s office and seldom refer to previous decisions of either the Minister or 
other jurisdictions. The integrity of these decisions is then questionable, 
particularly in the event that the Minister or the Convenor is required to address 
more complex matters such as climate change.  
Decisions of the Land and Environment Court of NSW (‘LEC’) have tackled 
some of these matters.  These precedents are essential to ensuring decision 
making adequately balances the competing economic, social and environmental 
factors often at play in environmental disputes, let alone climate change. As the 
Appeal Convenor process rarely incorporates its own, let alone foreign 
precedents, the benefit of such decisions in not able to be realised in Western 
Australia. 
                                                
82 www.appealsconvenor.wa.gov.au. 
83 Doherty, above n 24, 122. 
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It is acknowledged that tribunals such as the SAT are not bound by precedent 
either, however the SAT has already built a body of jurisprudence which can 
assist with determining future matters of a similar nature.84 Again, this is an 
essential feature necessary to a decision making body being equipped to tackle the 
complexity of climate change. Decisions of both the SAT and LEC will be 
examined later in this paper in support of this point.  
In conclusion the previous part has explained outlined key criticisms in relation to 
both merit and judicial review in Western Australia.  It has also examined how the 
principles of ESD can be applied to the existing EIA mechanisms to facilitate 
efforts to consider GHG emissions when approving large projects within the 
State. It has further been shown how the current appeal arrangements hinder this 
development. This supports the main argument of the paper, that appeal rights 
should be assigned to the SAT. The next section then seeks to provide a context 
for this approach by explain how it fits within existing climate theory and 
acknowledging it as a part in a bigger directional shift required to meet the 
challenges of climate change. 
 
  
                                                
84 Johnson, above n 15, 23. 
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III. THE CONTEXT OF APPEALS IN AN APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE 
Having identified the short comings of the EP Act’s appeal provisions, this part 
seeks to place the proposed amendments within the scope of the larger climate 
change picture. This will begin with an examination of current climate change 
theory and arguments in favour of a ‘bottom up’ approach as an alternative to 
existing international efforts such as the Kyoto Protocol. The role of public 
participation will then be examined as a fundamental component of a ‘bottom up’ 
approach and the role of climate change litigation will be examined as a 
regulatory approach. This will in turn provide a foundation for the discussion of 
key developments achieved through this litigation conducted in Part IV.  
1. A ‘Bottom Up’ Approach to a Wicked Problem 
This section will focus on current approaches to climate law and policy. Important 
to this discussion is the argument that international efforts have been ineffective 
due to being top-down approaches to governance.85 This same literature suggests 
a shift to a ‘bottom up’ approach which will be discussed below. Amending the 
existing appeal provisions in the EP Act to a court or tribunal is then presented as 
a ‘bottom up’ approach on account of its focus on lower level decisions making . 
                                                
85 See for example Steve Rayner, ‘How to Eat and Elephant: A Bottom Up approach to Climate 
Policy’, (2010) 10(6) Climate Policy 615; Gywn Prins and Steve Rayner, The Wrong Trousers: 
Radically rethinking Climate Policy (Joint Discussion Paper, James Martin Institute of Science 
and Civilization, University of Oxford and the MacKinder Centre for the Study of Long Wave 
Events, London School of Economics, 15; Mike Hulme, Why we disagree about Climate Change 
(Cambridge University press, 2009) 359-364. 
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1. Defining a ‘Bottom Up’ Approach 
A good starting point for defining a bottom up approach is as a contrast with 
existing international efforts which represent a ‘top down’ approach. Specifically, 
the Kyoto Protocol has prescribed emission reduction targets for a subset of its 
parties.86 The rationale behind this approach is the achievement of a universally 
inclusive regime which sets legally enforceable reduction targets for Annex I 
countries, which then integrates with a global carbon emissions target.87 This 
encourages nation states to implement domestic measures to reduce emissions and 
meet international obligations. This trickledown effect illustrates what is meant by 
a ‘top down’ approach.88  
Steve Rayner provides the clearest formulation for understanding what is meant 
by a ‘bottom up’ approach in his paper ’How To Eat An Elephant: A Bottom Up 
Approach To Climate Policy’.89 He suggests that the basic proposition of a 
‘bottom up’ approach is that ‘climate change policies should be designed and 
implemented at the lowest feasible level of organisation’.90 Rayner builds upon 
criticisms that the Kyoto Protocol should no longer be viewed at the ‘silver bullet’ 
to dealing with climate change and that other complementary measures should be 
                                                
86 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for 
signature 11 December 1997, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005), Annex B 
87 Steve Rayner, ‘How to Eat an Elephant: A Bottom Up approach to Climate Policy’, (2010) 
10(6) Climate Policy 615, 618. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid 617. 
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focused upon. 91  These specifically include a focus on adaptation and 
technological innovation particularly within the global energy sectors.92  
Importantly to the argument of this paper, it is acknowledged by Rayner that a 
bottom up approach does not limit action exclusively at a local level.93 Instead 
Rayner suggests that a more common sense approach be taken and that if 
something can be done at a lower level, it should be.94 This is consistent with the 
argument of this paper, that Western Australia should be taking steps to enable the 
regulation of GHG emissions. As the states in Australia are primarily responsible 
for land use and environment decision making, facilitating the regulation of GHG 
emissions is arguably a matter of enabling the existing EIA mechanism to fulfil its 
intended function.  
This is also consistent with Rayner’s observation that despite the appeal of an 
international approach to climate change, close to 80% of global GHG emissions 
originate in 20 of the 200 countries involved in the Kyoto Protocol. 95Australia is 
one of these 20, boasting one of the highest per capita release of GHG emissions 
in the world.96In turn, Western Australia’s engagement with GHG regulation is a 
feasible ‘bottom up’ approach, which focuses attention where it is needed to assist 
in a global response to climate change.  
                                                
91 Ibid; See also Gywn Prins and Steve Rayner, The Wrong Trousers: Radically rethinking Climate 
Policy (Joint Discussion Paper, James Martin Institute of Science and Civilization, University of 
Oxford and the MacKinder Centre for the Study of Long Wave Events, London School of 
Economics, 15.   
92 Ibid 619. 
93 Ibid 617. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data 
(2014) <http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty/Event.do?event=go>. 
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2. Wicked Problems and Clear Direction on Climate Change  
A key message from literature on climate policy is the need for a directional shift 
akin to ‘managing’ climate change compared to a view of ‘solving’ it. It is argued 
that enabling the courts to adjudicate climate disputes is part of this directional 
shift as it will facilitate the ongoing management of climate change. 
Key to Rayner’s argument in favour of a ‘bottom up’ approach is a shift in 
perceptions as how best to ‘deal’ with climate change. Rayner argues that one of 
the limitations of international efforts as a ‘top down’ approach is a focus on a 
specific ‘point of arrival’.97 He argues that whilst it is important to have widely 
recognised goals for limited atmospheric carbon concentrations, at present it is 
more important to establish a clear direction.98  
This notion blends well with the re-emergence of Horst W J Rittel and Melvin M 
Webber’s ‘wicked’ and ‘tame’ dichotomy. In 1973, Rittel and Webber introduced 
the concept of a ‘wicked’ problem as one that lack a simplistic planning 
response.99 They list several characteristics that readily apply to climate change 
such as it being difficult to clearly define on account of different stake holders 
with contrary views of an appropriate response. Wicked problems also have many 
interdependencies and are often multi-causal without a clear solution.  
Gwyn Prins and Steve Rayner apply Rittel and Webers dichotomy to climate 
change in their seminal work ‘The Wrong Trousers: Radically Rethinking Climate 
                                                
97 Rayner, above n 86, 620. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Horst W J Rittel and Melvin M Webber, ‘Dilemmas in General Theory of Planning’ (1973) 4 
Policy Sciences 166, 167. 
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Policy’.100 Central to their argument is the criticism is that previous issues 
addressed through international treaties, such as nuclear proliferation and sulphur 
emissions, despite being complex and serious, are regarded as ‘tame’ problems.101 
This term describes a type of problem for which a clear solution has been found. 
The examples above were able to be resolved as the causes could be identified and 
it was clear when a solution had been reached and implemented.102 
By contrast, climate change is a ‘wicked’ problem. This is owing to the difficulty 
in agreeing on a desired outcome or solution, demonstrated by the failure in 
reaching a global agreement on the extent and causes of climate change or its 
associated issues.103 The difficulty then with tackling climate change is that it is 
one part of a complex set of conditions effecting humanity. These include it’s 
inter jurisdictional nature and its required engagement with both state and non-
state parties, none of which have the authority to implement a single solution.104 
These circumstances have led to the suggestion that, as a wicked problem, climate 
change must be coped with and managed, not fixed.105  
This is also the take home message from Mike Hulme’s book ‘Why We Disagree 
about Climate Change’.106 Hulme scrutinizes the belief that the United Nations 
                                                
100 Gywn Prins and Steve Rayner, The Wrong Trousers: Radically rethinking Climate Policy (Joint 
Discussion Paper, James Martin Institute of Science and Civilization, University of Oxford and the 
MacKinder Centre for the Study of Long Wave Events, London School of Economics, 18. 
101 Rittel and Webber, above n 98, 167. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid; Prins and Rayner, above n 98.  
104 Prins and Rayner, above n 99, 16. 
105 Mike Hulme, Why we disagree about Climate Change Understanding Controversy, Inaction 
and Opportunity (Cambridge University press, 2009) 359-364. 
106 Ibid. 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol are the only 
ways of approaching climate change or that it is even the most appropriate way.  
This leads onto his main argument that climate change is not a ‘discrete problem’ 
waiting for ‘a solution’ but rather it requires an internalisation of how climate 
change reflects society’s values and beliefs. Hulme’s argument aligns with the 
position of this paper, that any meaningful response to climate change requires a 
reanalysis and acknowledgment of existing criticisms of Western Australia’s 
approach to environmental governance. 
In conclusion, this paper does not advocate amending appeal rights as a sole 
solution to climate change. Rather, providing appeal rights acknowledges the 
complexity of the climate change problem.  The courts are then are able to 
function as part of the directional shift suggested by international literature, and 
enable the effective ‘management ‘of climate change from the lowest levels of 
decision making. This is consistent with a ‘bottom up approach’ as suggested by 
Rayner and Prins, and as one of many steps required for a meaningful response to 
climate change. 
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2. Public Participation 
This section will explain how public participation, particularly in the EIA process, 
leads to increased scrutiny on decision makers and the importance of this in 
developing a response to climate change.  The nexus between public participation 
and the right to appeal will then be explored and it will be explained how this 
process is a ‘bottom up approach’ to climate change. 
1. The importance of Public Participation  
As noted above, the EPA describes the EIA process as 
A predictive tool that is systematically applied at the early planning and 
design stages of development proposals so that government and community 
can form a view about a proposal’s environmental acceptability and what 
conditions, if any, should be applied to control potential risks and 
impacts.107 
The reference to community infers a participatory role by the public which 
enhances environmental outcomes through consultation with affected parties.108 
Such a process is indicative of a ‘bottom up’ approach and essential to a 
meaningful approach to climate change. 
 
                                                
107 Environmental Protection Authority Western Australia, above n 1. 
108 Adrian Finanzio, ‘Public Participation, Transparency and Accountability – Essential 
Ingredients for Good Decision Making’ (2015) 2(1) Australian Environmental Law Digest 3.  
 
 35 
 
Adrian Finanzio discusses the importance of public participation in his article 
‘Public Participation, Transparency and Accountability – Essential Ingredients for 
Good Decision Making’.109 Finanzio argues that for decisions to be ‘good’, they 
must enjoy the confidence of the people on which they impact. He states that it is 
through the process of public participation that members of the community can 
raise their concerns and have them considered in the decision making process. 110  
Relevant to the argument of this paper is Finanzio’s argument that it is the 
expectation of scrutiny by the public that necessarily raises the standard of 
government oversight of projects and proposals.111 New South Wales’s procedural 
requirement for GHG emissions to be considered in the EIA process serves as a 
case in point.  This requirement only came to be through public interest litigation, 
namely Gray v Minister for Planning (‘Gray’).112 This case will be discussed in 
further detail below, however at point here is the increased scrutiny imposed on 
the government as a result of this litigation.  Following Gray, it is now a 
mandatory requirement for projects with substantial GHG emissions to include 
these emissions in information provided to the Minister when making the final 
decision.  
This is exactly the kind of regulatory development which this paper advocates is 
possible through public participation, specifically by allowing the right to appeal 
decisions made in the EIA process. Without this scrutiny there is an unfortunate 
                                                
109 Finanzio, above n 107.   
110Ibid 114. 
111 Ibid. 
112Gray v Minister for Planning (2006) 152 LGERA 258. 
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tendency for economic development to weigh more heavily in the mind of 
decision makers due to their easily identifiable benefits.   
Jenny Steele discusses the failure of immediate human interests to fully 
encapsulate environmental impacts in her article ‘Participation and Deliberation in 
Environmental Law’.113According to Steele the focus on ‘interests’ in processes 
such as EIA results in ‘an approach which gives priority to concrete interests’ 
such as commercial gain and employment.114 This is especially true when these 
concrete interests are contrast with perceivably remote arguments of 
environmental risk.115 She argues that it is the process of public participation 
which can result in a broader scope of considerations in the decision making 
process.116  
Due to the ‘remoteness’ of risk presented by climate change, it is then essential 
that public participation is able to highlight this risk, particularly in the context of 
large scale natural resource exploitation which presents the perception of short- 
term economic benefits.  
2. Public Participation and the Right to Appeal  
This section will highlight the nexus between public participation and the right to 
appeal. The right to appeal as an important feature of public participation is 
discussed by Madeleine Figg is her piece ‘Protecting Third Part Rights to Appeal, 
                                                
113 Jenny Steele, ‘Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a Problem-
Solving Approach’, (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 415.   
114 Ibid 420. 
115 Ibid 423.   
116 Ibid.  
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Protecting the Environment’. 117  Similar to the arguments of Finanzio, Figg 
addresses the detrimental impact of ‘streamlining’ the environmental approvals 
process by limiting the right of third party appeal.  
Importantly to the argument of this paper is Figg’s empirical evidence which 
reflects the success of third party appeals in the Tasmanian Resource Management 
and Planning Appeal Tribunal (RMPAT). Success in this context refers to cases 
which resulted in the overturning or approval of permits with additional 
conditions.118 Accordingly to this data 76% of appeals heard by the tribunal were 
considered successful.119 Figg comments that ‘such a high figure is suggestive of 
the key role that the third party appeal process occupies in bringing unmeritorious 
decision to the attention of an independent decision making body such as the  
RMPAT.  
Further, Figg’s analysis identifies the distinction between appeals brought in 
public and private interest.  She notes that despite both enjoying equal rate of 
success, appeals in the public interest more often resulted in the variance of 
conditions compared to the permit being overturned.120  These findings also 
support Finanzio’s argument that public participation increases scrutiny on 
decisions makers and results in better environmental outcomes.  It is also worth 
noting that  for proponents and Government, additional conditions are a desirable 
outcome when compared with a permit being over turned. This suggests a level of 
                                                
117 Madeleine Figg, ‘Protecting Third Part Rights to Appeal, Protecting the Environment: A 
Tasmanian Case Study’, (2014) 31 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 210.  
118 Ibid 220.  
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid 221. 
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compromise is being reached between community interests and development, as 
conveyed by the EIA mission statement at the beginning of this section.  
The importance of public participation in enhancing government decision making 
is essential in the context of climate change.  Due to the remote characteristics of 
its risks, climate change is not a matter considered in the approval of projects 
despite their potential contribution to GHG emissions. The right to appeal in 
Western Australia would ensure that decisions making around climate change 
benefits from the increased scrutiny and lead to ’bottom up’ developments such as 
the consideration of GHG emissions in the EIA process. 
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3. The Role of Climate Change Litigation 
The following section introduces the phenomenon of climate change litigation and 
its’ complimentary role in the regulation of GHG emissions.  This discussion will 
also move through the notion of climate change litigation as a bottom up approach 
and outline its importance in encouraging judicial interpretation of existing 
environmental legislation in line with ESD principles. 
1. An Introduction to Climate Change Litigation 
Climate Change litigation is a term used to describe a broad range of matters each 
with varying foci related to climate change. This litigation has been particularly 
prominent in Australia and the U.S, a consequence commentators such as 
Jacqueline Peel, Hari Osofsky and Brian Preston attribute to both nations having 
significant coal industries and slow responses to both domestic and international 
climate change efforts.121  
This litigation has sparked a significant body of academic literature seeking to 
highlight common themes and provide a scope of which to determine its successes 
and failures to address climate change.122  Peel and Osofsky’s article ’The Role of 
                                                
121 Hari M Osofsky and Jacqueline Peel, ‘The Role of Litigation in Multilevel Climate Change 
Governance: Possibilities of a Lower Carbon Future? (2013) 30 Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 303; Brian J Preston, ‘Climate Change in the Courts’ (2010) 36(1) Monash University 
Law Review 15. 
122 See for example Hari Osofsky, ‘The Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation’, 
(2010) 1 Climate Law 3; Hari M Osofsky and Jacqueline Peel, ‘The Role of Litigation in 
Multilevel Climate Change Governance: Possibilities of a Lower Carbon Future? (2013) 30 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 303; Brian J Preston, ‘Climate Change in the Courts’ 
(2010) 36(1) Monash University Law Review 15; Peel J, ‘The Role of Climate Change Litigation 
in Australia’s Response to Global Warming’ (2007) 24 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 
90, 90-105; Brian Preston, ‘Leadership by the Courts in Achieving Sustainability’ (2010) 27 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 321.     
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Litigation in Multilevel Climate Change Governance’123 provides understanding 
of the ‘ways in which litigation serves as regulation, mandates regulation and 
fosters regulation – as well as its limits and helps to provide a more complete 
view of how litigation has, is and could help to produce more effective 
approaches to the regulation of GHG emissions.’124  
Their article is relevant as it provides not only a definition for what constitutes 
climate change litigation, but also presents litigation as ‘one part of the regulatory 
puzzle’.125 It is argued by Peel and Osofsky that regulatory litigation will be 
necessary regardless of the success of international efforts such as the Kyoto 
Protocol. This is due to the need to fill what they describe as ‘regulatory gaps’ 
which exist due to the jurisdictional complexities of climate change.126 Litigation 
is then necessary to fill these gaps and ensure regulatory efforts are both 
consistent and equitable.127 
This is consistent with the view of this paper, that providing adequate avenues for 
litigation is an essential complimentary measure in efforts to address climate 
change. Indeed to suggest any one ‘solution’ would be inconsistent with the 
examination undertaken in the previous sections.  
                                                
123 Osofsky and Peel, above n 121. 
124 Osofsky and Peel, above n 121; Brian J Preston ‘The Influence of Climate Change Litigation 
on Government and the Private Sector’ (2011) 2(4) Climate Law 485. 
125 Osofsky and Peel, above n 121,  315. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid 316.  
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2. Defining the Scope of Climate Change Litigation 
Climate change litigation is difficult to define due to its interaction with various 
jurisdictions and areas of substantive law. For the purposes of this paper a broad 
view is taken in that climate change is not required to be the central focal point of 
the litigation.   
This is important in the context of EIA as climate change is not always the sole 
focus of the process. It is rather one consideration which this paper argues could 
be included in the decision making process as consequence of providing adequate 
merit review and an insistence of ESD principles in decisions making.   
The following figure then provides a visual aid to assist in understanding where 
cases addressing GHG regulation in EIA would fit within spectrum of climate 
change litigation. 
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FIGURE 1128 EIA’S PLACEMENT IN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
 
3. Litigation as a Bottom Up Approach  
Litigation provides an opportunity for interaction between the community and all 
levels of decision makering.129  In this way enabling the right to review would 
facilitate the climate change conversation with local and state government as well 
as the general public and relevant organisations.  
                                                
128 Ibid 305. 
129 Hari Osofsky, ‘The Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation’, (2010) 1 Climate 
Law 3, 4. 
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Osofsky argues that both successful and unsuccessful cases dealing with climate 
change have the benefit of putting both legal and moral pressure on a wide range 
on individuals and entities to act.130  
Litigation can also be viewed as a form of public participation. The ability to 
challenge decisions before an independent body is widely recognised as having 
beneficial impacts on the decisions making process.131 These include increasing 
scrutiny and transparency so as to ensure decisions made enjoy the confidence of 
the people on which they impact.132 By enabling this engagement with the public, 
litigation is then facilitating a bottom up approach, consistent with this focus of 
this Part.  
4. The Role of Statutory Interpretation in Climate Change Litigation 
Litigation is generally viewed as a forum for enforcement and interpretation of the 
law rather than a potential site of regulatory development. It has however been 
argued that in the courts can approach litigation with a view to develop the law.133 
The following section will examine this notion and prepare a foundation for the 
following Part which examines the relevant case law. 
                                                
130 Ibid 6. 
131 See for example Ronnie Harding, Carolyn Hendriks and Mehreen Faruqi, Environmental 
Decision Making Exploring Complexity and Context (Federation Press, 2009), 167 - 171.  
132 Finanzio, above n 107, 12. 
133 Osofsky and Peel, above n121; Peel J, ‘The Role of Climate Change Litigation in Australia’s 
Response to Global Warming’ (2007) 24 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 90, 90-105; 
Brian Preson, ‘Leadership by the Courts in Achieving Sustainability’ (2010) 27 Environmental 
and Planning Law Journal 321. 
 44 
 
Peel and Osofsky acknowledge the limited pathways for courts to impose direct 
regulatory measures as required by the doctrine of separation of powers.134 It is 
worth briefly commenting here on the boundaries imposed by the doctrine and the 
implication for the courts as a vessel for regulatory change.  
This is the focus of Justice Brian Preston in his article ‘Leadership by the courts in 
achieving sustainability’.135 Preston argues that the courts should play an active 
role in developing the law as the three branches of government – the legislature, 
executive and judiciary, are all partners in the goal of achieving sustainable 
development.136  
Preston also argues that ‘the separation of powers is not pure in that, in addition to 
its primary function, each branch of government can perform some functions that 
belong to other branches, provided they are intimately related to the branch’s 
primary function’.137  
This supports the argument that in interpreting legislation, the court should regard 
the legislation’s objectives and the ESD principles therein.  As Preston points out, 
the process of statutory interpretation does not then infringe the doctrine of 
separation of powers and is consistent with the judiciary’s role in interpreting the 
law.138 
                                                
134 Osofsky and Peel, above n 121, 134. 
135 Preson, above n 134. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid 37. 
138 Ibid 39. 
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This is consistent with the argument of Peel and Osofsky, that statutory 
interpretation provides a promising avenue by which the courts can reinterpret 
existing pollution control and environmental statues to encompass climate 
changing emissions.139 It is by this process that the courts are able to require the 
consideration of ESD principles in response climate change concerns raised in the 
EIA process.  
These points are central to the argument of this paper as they provide authority to 
the notion that the judiciary can apply the principles of ESD to existing 
environmental legislation so as to encapsulate issues related to climate change. It 
is by this process that providing a right to merit review for EP Act decisions, 
would enable regulatory measures to be developed in Western Australia and the 
ensure decisions making is done so with consideration of legal developments 
discussed in the following Part. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
139 Osofsky and Peel, above n 121, 321. 
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IV. THE FRUIT OF LITIGATION: AN EXAMINATION OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 
THROUGH CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION 
The following Part will examine cases that highlight developments as a result of 
climate change litigation. This will be done in four sections. 
The first will deal specifically with the incorporation of ESD principles into 
Australian jurisprudence.  The case of Telstra v Hornby Shire Council140  is 
important as it was the first Australian case to examine the ESD principles in 
detail and provided a signal to decision makers that they are under a statutory 
obligation to consider them. Following this, the Taralga Wind farm141 case will be 
examined as an example of ESD principles being applied within the context of 
climate change.  
The second section will explore two key examples of the re-interpretation of 
existing environmental legislation resulting in a regulatory impact on GHG 
emissions. The first of these cases is the Australian decision of Gray v Minister 
for Planning.142   This examination will specifically focus on Justice Pain’s 
implementation of ESD principles and the resulting requirement for the 
consideration of GHG emissions in EIA. The case of Massachusetts v 
Environmental Protection Agency143 will then be examined as the U.S case serves 
as the most significant example of the court imposing the regulation of GHG 
emissions as pollutants.  These cases are important as they affirm the role of the 
                                                
140 Telstra Corporation Limited v Hornsby Shire Council [2006] NSWLEC 133. 
141 Taralga Landscape Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning and RES Southern Cross Pty Ltd 
[2007] NSWLEC 59.  
142 Gray v Minister for Planning (2006) 152 LGERA 258, 255. 
143 Massacheutts v Environmental Protection Agency 549 US 497, 127 S.Ct. (2007). 
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court in interpreting existing environmental statutes to incorporate climate change 
considerations. 
The Third section will outline the impact of climate change litigation on matters 
of causation and indirect or cumulative impacts.  These topics are important as 
they have historically been sticking points for climate change debate. The court’s 
approach to these issues is then significance as they demonstrate the law dealing 
with these complex problems.  
The final of these sections will move closer to home and examine decisions of the 
SAT with relation to the Planning and Development Act (2005). Specifically, it 
will be explored how the SAT has implemented environmental consideration into 
the planning decision making process. These examples are relevant as the process 
of EIA is similar with respect to planning and environmental decisions making. 
The consideration of environmental principles, specifically ESD, then evidences 
the importance of the SAT in developing these principles and applying them in 
Western Australian decisions making. These points are important as the 
recommendations in Part V will advocate in favour of assigning responsibility of 
appeal to the SAT. 
1. Developing the Principles of Ecologically Sustainable Development  
One of the key contributions of climate change litigation is developing the 
principles of ESD.144 ESD has animated much of Australia’s environmental law 
                                                
144 Tim Bonyhady and Peter Christoff,  ‘The New Australian Climate Law’ in Tim Bonyhady and 
Peter Christoff (eds), Climate Law in Australia (Federation Press, 2007) 19,  20. 
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since its conception in the early 1990s and forms the objectives of most 
environmental statues in the country.145 They are an essential component to 
climate change law as they allow closer criticism of decision making and provide 
a mechanism for the courts to access the merit of decisions. Their development 
through climate change litigation then has the added benefit of contributing to the 
broader field of environmental and planning jurisprudence. 
The two principles that have found the most traction in Australia are the 
Precautionary Principle and Intergenerational Equity. Their application in the 
following cases has been fundamental to their development and accordingly has 
been described as putting the meat on the bones of ESD.146  
1. Telstra v Hornsbury Shire Council 
A key Australian case that considers ESD is Telstra Corporation Limited v 
Hornsby Shire Council.147 The case was heard in the New South Wales Land and 
Environment Court under Justice Preston.  The dispute was a result of the local 
community of Cheltemham in North-Western Sydney, opposing the construction 
of telecommunications infrastructure upon fears it would cause adverse health 
effects. The case was ultimately decided in favour of Telstra, however Justice 
Preston addressed the principles of ESD and specifically the precautionary 
principle in detail.  
                                                
145 Ibid. 
146 Brian J Preston ‘The Influence of Climate Change Litigation on Government and the Private 
Sector’ (2011)  2(4) Climate Law 485. 
147 [2006] NSWLEC 133. 
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His honour summarised the precautionary principal by reference to the NSW 
Protection of the Environment Administration Act148as follows: 
If there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as reasoning for postponing measures to 
prevent environmental degradation. In the application of the principle… decisions 
should be guided by:  
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or irreversible 
damage to the environment; and  
(ii) an assessment of risk-weighted consequence or various options.  
The most significant points of Justice Preston's decision are; 
1. The precautionary principle shifts the burden of proof.  ‘a decision maker must 
assume the threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage is a reality 
[and] the burden of showing this threat is negligible reverts to the 
proponent…’149 
2. That the precautionary principle invokes preventative action:’ the principle 
permits the taking of preventative measures without having to wait until the 
reality and seriousness of the threat become fully known.’  
3. The precautionary measures appropriate will depend on the combined effect of 
the proposal – ‘The more significant and uncertain the threat, the greater… the 
precaution required’150 
                                                
148 Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW) S6(2).  
149 Telstra Corporation Limited v Hornsby Shire Council  [2006] NSWLEC 133, 113. 
150 Ibid 182. 
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The decision of Justice Preston in Telstra not only represents a comprehensive 
analysis of the precautionary principle in the judicial context, but it also provides 
clear guidance to decisions makers as to when the principle applies. The case also 
highlights the importance of the principles of ESD, particularly when decision 
makers are under a statutory obligation to consider them. Accordingly, the 
principles of ESD were recognised as more than a merely aspirational objective 
and given substantive weight by which to scrutinise decisions.151  
2. The Taralga Case 
The Taralga decision extends the implications of intergenerational equity with 
relation to GHG emission intensive projects, but does so by considering the 
positive intergenerational impacts of renewable energy projects that reduce 
emissions.152  
The case concerned the opposition of a wind farm comprising of 62 turbines on 
grounds of their potential impacts on amenity and environment including aesthetic 
impacts, noise emissions and impact on flora and fauna.153 The objectors brought 
a merits appeal before the NSWLEC and included in the dispute was the 
relevance of ESD principles to the decision making process. 
Justice Preston noted in his decision that consideration was required of the 
geographically narrower concerns raised by the objectors, compared to the benefit 
                                                
151 Preston, above n 146, 492. 
152 Peel, above n 17, 954.   
153 Taralga Landscape Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning (2007) 161 LGERA 1, 15-17 
(Preston CJ). 
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of establishing renewable energy on ameliorating climate change.154 His honour 
cited the ‘greater public good’ and the principle of intergenerational equity in 
finding in favour of the project,155 noting that the principle’s impact on energy 
production should involve a requirement 
as far a practicable, to increasingly substitute energy sources that result in less 
greenhouse gas emissions for energy sources that result in more greenhouse gas 
emissions, thereby reducing the cumulative and long term effects caused by 
anthropogenic climate change. In this the present generation reduces the adverse 
consequences for future generations.156  
The case provides an important signal that the principle of intergenerational 
equity will require broader long-term thinking when considering proposals which 
are in the ‘public interest’.  The case is also important as it demonstrates that the 
principles of ESD being applied to further development and balance competing 
environmental interests, that is the impact of the construction versus the reduction 
in GHG emissions.  
2. Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions through the Re-interpretation of 
Environmental Legislation  
The following cases highlight key regulatory developments as a result of the court 
re-interpreting existing environmental legislation. This is the same process by 
which the EP Act could function to regulate GHG emissions. These cases then 
                                                
154 Peel, above n 17, 957.   
155 Taralga Landscape Guardians Inc v Minister for Planning (2007) 161 LGERA 1, 12  per 
Preston CJ. 
156 Ibid. 
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serve as examples in support of providing adequate right to review in Western 
Australia.      
1. Gray v the Minister for Planning 
The Australian case most attributed for developing ESD principles in a climate 
change context is the Gray decision.157 The case challenged the assessment of the 
Anvil Hill project, including a proposed coalmine, and the failure to consider the 
emissions associated with the burning of the coal produced by the mine  
Although being an instance of judicial review, the case highlights the insistence of 
ESD principles in relation to projects with significant GHG emission. It also 
serves as an example of the court imposing a procedural requirement for GHG 
emissions to be included in the process of EIA for major extraction projects. 
It is in the EPA’s report to the Minster that the court insisted upon the 
consideration of GHG emissions which, as noted above, is an entirely informative 
document that and holds no bearing on the final decision. This did not lead to the 
refusal of the Anvil Hill project nor other coal mines in the region. What is did do 
however was bring attention to the issue and force an acknowledgment by 
decision maker that these emissions are of environmental concern. 
Due to the process of appeal in Western Australia, an acknowledgment of this sort 
is unlikely without assistance. This is due to the Minister being responsible for 
determining appeals whilst also having engaged in the section 45 process. 
Significant criticism has been levelled at this process, describing the appeal 
                                                
157 (2006) 152 LGERA 258. 
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determination as a ‘precursor’ to a decision made in accordance with the interests 
of other decision making authorities in the section 45 process. 
The other key development of the Anvill Hill case was the development of ESD. 
Pain J’s judgment contains a detailed consideration of the role both 
intergenerational equity and the precautionary principal play in structuring the 
process of EIA. It was through these principles that her Honour insisted GHG 
emissions were within the scope of the legislation. 
Her Honour found that ESD was relevant to her review by way of considering 
how they applied to the objectives of the relevant State legislation, which 
encouraged ESD.158 It was found that intergenerational equity required that an 
assessment consider the cumulative impacts of the project on the environment and 
this included the emissions produced from the ‘use’ of the coal. Accordingly, the 
indirect impacts of the mine were required to be considered in the assessment of 
the project.  
In considering the impact of the precautionary principal, her honour highlighted 
the fact that the purpose of EIA is to provide the decision maker with provisional 
information in order to assess potential impacts of the proposal. It is then 
appropriate that the assessment includes information to enable consideration of 
any scientific uncertainties regarding serious or irreversible environmental harm 
that has been identified.159  
                                                
158 Ibid at 291. 
159 Ibid 295-6. 
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For adequate consideration of both principles her honour concluded that indirect 
emissions are the kind of knowledge required for any decision involving large 
releases of GHG emissions due and their impacts being ‘cumulative, on going and 
long term’.160 Only with this information is the Minister then able to determine 
adequate measures to be considered to prevent environmental degradation as a 
result of the project. Accordingly, a failure to include this information is a failure 
to consider the precautionary principal.161 
Further, The Anvil Hill decision is also relevant to the argument presented in this 
paper in favour removing restrictions related to standing in judicial review. In that 
decision, the applicant was a 28 year old male named Peter Gray who sought 
judicial review of the decision to approve the mine. Mr Gray’s only ‘special 
interest’ was on account of his being a member of the Rising Tide organisation 
who’s purpose is to address matters related to climate change. 
If Mr Gray had raised such a case here in Western Australia, it is reasonable to 
assume he, like the example of the Lewin society discussed above,162 would have 
had difficulty satisfying the common law standards of ‘special interest’. In New 
South Wales s 123 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act163 grants 
standing to ‘any person, without exception’. The case of Anvil highlights the 
importance of litigation and removing standing limitations which would hinder its 
operation.  
                                                
160 Ibid 296. 
161 Ibid 296-7. 
162 Judicial review was discussed on page 25. 
163 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) s 123. 
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2. Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency 
The case of Massachusetts v Environment Protection Agency 
(‘Massachusetts’)164was a judicial review involving the State of Massachusetts 
together with 11 other states, three cities, two United States territories and several 
environmental groups who sought review of the denial by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (‘EP Agency’) of a petition to regulate GHG emissions under 
the Clean Air Act. The petition related to the discretion of the EP Agency to 
regulate air pollution reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.  
The EP Agency denied that GHG were air pollutants and also raised procedural 
challenges once the litigation commenced. This included challenging the 
petitioners standing. 
With relation to Standing, the US Supreme Court held that the State of 
Massachusetts should succeed. The court applied a three-part test requiring that: 
1) The plaintiff has suffered ‘an injury in fact’ which is both concrete and 
particularised, and actual and imminent, as opposed to conjectural or 
hypothetical. 
2) The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant. 
3) There is a likelihood that the injury can be redressed by a favourable 
decision, as opposed to this being merely speculation. 
                                                
164 Massacheutts v Environmental Protection Agency 549 US 497, 127 S.Ct. (2007). 
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The court accepted these elements were met particularly as the State was the 
‘owner’ of its coastal land from which it would receive injury through sea level 
rise as a result of anthropogenic climate change.165 
The court’s approach to causation is also noteworthy. Whilst the EP Agency did 
not contest the link between GHG emissions and climate change, it did argue that 
the harm as a result of the vehicles was so insignificant to the plaintiff that it 
could not be challenged in court.166 The court did not accept this, stating  
it’s argument rests on the erroneous assumption that a small, incremental step, 
because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum. Yet 
accepting that premise would doom most challenges to regulatory action. Agencies, 
like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory 
swoop.167 
Finally, with relation to the question of interpreting if GHG emissions were air 
pollutants per the Clean Air Act, the court affirmed that they were. This had the 
result of requiring the EP Agency to exercise their discretion as to if the emissions 
were reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare and if so to 
regulate them accordingly.       
One of key developments to come from Massachusetts was the Supreme Court’s 
approach to Standing. The case has set a precedent in the U.S for standing 
requirement in common law actions. This is distinguishable from the common law 
                                                
165 Massacheutts v Environmental Protection Agency 549 US 497, 519 S.Ct. (2007). 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
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‘special interest’ test applied in Western Australia, however the courts accepting 
of the test in Massachusetts could be presented as persuasive in a climate change 
context.  
Both these cases are also examples of executive action on climate change spurred 
through litigation. Following the case of Gray, the NSW government introduced a 
State Environmental Planning Policy to ensure that indirect emissions from 
natural resource exploitation projects were considered in the decision making 
process. 168 Similarly, the EP Authority in the U.S has published a finding 
acknowledging GHG emissions as endangering ‘the public health and welfare of 
current and future generations’.169 Note the relation this has to the principle of 
intergenerational equity. As of 2007, GHG emissions from stationary sources 
have also undergone a permit based regulatory process.170   
These cases highlight the role of the court in re-interpreting existing 
environmental legislation to encompass the effects of climate change. They are 
strong examples of how regulatory action can be effected in Western Australia 
under the EP Act and the important role litigation could play in this process.  
  
                                                
168 State Environmental Planning Policy (Mining, Petroleum Production and Extractive Industries) 
2007 (NSW), S 14. 
169 US Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Endangerment and Cause or Contribution Findings for 
Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act’, 74(239) Federal Register (15 
December 2009), 66496, available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html. 
170 See US Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Air Act Permitting of Greenhouse Gases, 
<http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ghgpremitting.html>.  
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3. Developing the Climate Change Debate 
This section will outline how climate change litigation has developed the law with 
relation to causation and cumulative impacts. These developments then evidence 
the importance of litigation as a response to climate change.  
1. Considering Causation 
Causation has been a significant sticking point for challenging decisions to 
approve GHG intensive projects such as coalmines. The reason for this is that 
whilst the development of a project may produce substantial GHG emissions, 
these emissions are not ‘significant’ in respect to global emissions. The ability to 
establish a causal relationship between greenhouse gas emissions, climate change 
and environmental harm has been essential to the question of significance as 
required by EIA.171  
The courts have been prepared to rule in favour of considering the potential 
impacts of climate change in two cases litigated in Australia. Firstly, in an early 
case involving the extension of the life of the coal-fired Hazelwood power station, 
the VCAT was required to consider whether the emissions the plant would 
generate were relevant to amending a planning scheme necessary to authorise the 
proposal.172 It was found that such matters were relevant and that the approval 
would 
                                                
171 See discussion of significance at page 10. 
172 Peel, above n 17, 958.  
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Make it more probable that the Hazelwood Power Station will continue to operate 
beyond 2009; which in turn, may make it more likely that the atmosphere will 
receive greater greenhouse gas emissions than would otherwise be the case; which 
may be an environmental effect of significance.173 
Gray is another example. Despite the proposal producing an estimated 10.5 
million tonnes of Coal annually,174 with greenhouse gas emissions averaging 12 
414 387 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per annum, it was argued that these emissions 
would have a significant local impact. 175  
To the contrary it was argued that as this only consisted of 0.04 per cent of global 
emissions, the impact of the project was not significant. Pain J of the NSWLEC 
accepted the applicant’s argument that GHG emissions from the burning of coal 
should be considered in the proponent’s environmental assessment due to their 
potential contribution to climate change.176 Importantly to the debate of causation, 
her honour found that despite there being many contributing factors globally to 
climate change, the contribution from a single large source such as the Anvil Hill 
Project should not be ignored.177 Consequently her honour held that 
there is a sufficient proximate link between the mining of a very substantial reserve 
of thermal coal in NSW, the only purpose of which is the use as fuel in power 
stations, and the emissions of GHG which contribute to climate change/global 
warming, which is impacting now and likely to continue to do so on the Australian 
                                                
173 Australian Conservation Foundation v Latrobe City Council (2004) 140 LGERA 100, 110.  
174  David Farrier, ‘The Limits of Judicial Review: Anvil Hill in the Land and Environment Court’ 
in Tim Bonyhady and Peter Christoff (eds), Climate Law in Australia (2007) 189. 
175 Gray v Minister for Planning (2006) 152 LGERA 258, 255. 
176 Ibid 260. 
177 Ibid 287. 
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and consequently NSW environment, to require assessment of that GHG 
contribution of the coal when burnt in an environmental assessment…178 
The approach taken to the issue of causation in both these cases reflects a broader, 
global trend of climate change litigation.179 As noted above in the case of 
Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Authority, the U.S Supreme Court 
accepted that a sufficient causal link between greenhouse emissions from cars in 
the US and global climate change existed that the Environmental Protection 
Agency was required to regulate these emissions.180  The majority held that the 
six percent contribution of the transport sector to worldwide emissions was a 
meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas concentrations and should be 
addressed regardless of what happens elsewhere.181  
Acceptance of a causal link between emissions in Australia and climate change is 
however far from certain. Many judgments have accepted and applied narrow 
approaches to causation in line with reasoning of de minimus; that the law 
requires more than trivial or a significant contributing factor.  
This approach is reflected in the reasoning of Dowsett J in the Wildlife 
Whitsunday case when approaching the review of two coal-mines in the Bowen 
Basin.182 It was found that under the Federal Environmental Protection and 
                                                
178 Ibid 288. 
179 Peel, above n17, 955.  
180 549 US 497, 523-5 (for Stevens, Kennedt, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer JJ) (2007). Roberts CJ, 
with whom Scalia, Thomas and Alito JJ joined, dissented: at 542-5. 
181 Ibid 526 (Stevens J for Stevens Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer JJ). 
182 Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch Inc v Minister for 
the Environment and Heritage (2006) 232 ALR 510. 
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Biological Conservation Act 183(‘EPBC Act’), that the mines were not likely to 
have a significant impact on areas of ‘National Significance’. With respect to 
causation, his honour stated  
I have proceeded upon the basis that the greenhouse gas emissions consequent 
upon the burning of coal mined in one of these projects might arguably cause in 
impact upon a protected matter, which impact could be said to be an impact of the 
proposed action . . . however, I am far from satisfied that the burning of coal at 
some unidentified place in the world, the production of greenhouse gases from 
such combustion, its contribution towards global warming and the impact of global 
warming upon a protected matter, can be so described.184 
It should be noted that under the EPBC, the Minister is required to consider the 
impact of the proposal not on the ‘environment’ generally, as is required by State 
Acts, but rather the impact on specific matters of ‘National Significance’.185 In 
this case the area was the Great Barrier Reef. This extra link in the reasoning 
process requires that GHG emissions impact specifically on the Great Barrier 
Reef, a step Justice Dowsett was not prepared to accept.  This does however make 
the decision arguably distinguishable in its application to questions of causation.  
                                                
183 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). 
184 Wildlife Preservation Society of Queensland Proserpine/Whitsunday Branch Inc v Minister for 
the Environment and Heritage (2006) 232 ALR 510, 524 (Dowsett J). 
185 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) pt 3 div 1. 
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2. Accounting for Indirect and Cumulative Impacts 
There have also been developments in extending the scope of EIA to encompass 
the downstream emissions of proposals.186 The Hazlewood case is one example 
where the court was prepared to find that these downstream effects were required 
to be considered due to their impact on climate change.187 In that case Justice 
Morris reasoned that submissions on climate change grounds should not be 
precluded due to their being an indirect impact. His Honour proposed the test for 
assessing the environmental impacts of the proposed scheme should be 
Whether the effect may flow from the approval of the amendment; and if not, 
whether, having regard to the probability of the effect and the consequences of the 
effect (if it occurs), the effect is significant in the context of the amendment.188  
It is unclear if the EIA process encompasses a consideration of cumulative 
impacts.189  Through its very nature attempts to consider climate change in the 
EIA process requires a holistic approach. Through this we can see the law 
developing as a result of climate change litigation and the arguably beneficial 
outcome this has on environmental jurisprudence generally.   
                                                
186 Minister for Environment and Heritage v Queensland Conservation Council Inc (2004) 139 
FCR 24, 40 (Black CJ, Ryan and Finn JJ); Gray v Minister for Planning (2006) 152 LGERA 258, 
255.  
187 Australian Conservation Foundation v Latrobe City Council (2004) 140 LGERA 100. 
188 (2004) LGERA 100, 109. 
189 Peel, above n 17, 961. 
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4. Closer to Home: Examining Planning Decisions of the State 
Administrative Tribunal 
This section will examine the SAT’s implementation of environmental 
considerations with relation to the PD Act. In Preston’s article ‘Climate Change in 
the Courts’ he makes the point that an analysis of ESD principles in case law 
provides an insight as to how matters related to climate change may be addressed 
in specific jurisdictions.190 This analysis of SAT decisions proceeds on a similar 
notion.  
By examining the consideration of environmental considerations in planning 
disputes, we are able see how the substantive law of planning has been developed 
by the SAT’s decisions. This draws attention to the important precedents created 
by the SAT which, it is argued, demonstrate it’s ability to develop climate change 
jurisprudence should the SAT be assigned responsibility of determining appeals 
under the EP Act.   
1. An Introduction to the Planning and Development Act 
The functions of planning and environmental protection are interrelated yet 
intrinsically different. 191 The essence of planning law is determining the best use 
of natural resources in accordance with the objectives, the criteria and the 
methodology of decision making prescribed by the legislation. 192 Environmental 
protection on the other hand aim is to reduce or regulate the risk of environmental 
                                                
190 Brian Preston, ‘Climate Change in the Courts’ (2010) 36 Monash Law Review 15, 16. 
191 Doug Fisher, ‘The Statutory Relevance of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Environmental 
Regulation’ (2007) 24 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 210.  
192 Gerry Bates, ‘Environmental Law in Australia’ (2010, 7th Edition)  Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
188.  
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degradation that are perceived to be the consequence of specifically identifiable 
operational activities.193  
Upon enactment, the PD Act continued the statutory planning system that had 
existed in Western Australia since the enactment of the Town Planning and 
Development Act 1928 (WA).  One important change however was the inclusion 
of a statement of purpose in section 3, which requires to ‘sustainable use and 
development of land in the State’.194 Section 3(1)(c) has been important in 
influencing State Planning Policies and its inclusion suggests that environmental 
considerations, as well as planning considerations, were to be considered in 
making decisions under the Act.  
It will be noted that this objective is similar to the principles of ESD found in the 
objectives of the EP Act.195The SAT’s consideration of this objective is then 
important as it illustrates the SAT developing the law in a manner similar to the 
development of ESD with respect to environmental protection legislation.  
  
                                                
193 Ibid 273.  
194 Planning and Development Act 2005 (WA), s 3(1)(c). 
195 Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) s 4. 
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2. The Nexus Between Planning and Environmental Principles 
The role of environmental considerations in the PD Act is important for two 
reasons. Firstly, it evidences the SAT developing the law to consider 
environmental factors, a process not originally contemplated by the Act. 
Secondly, the inclusion of environmental considerations demonstrates an ability 
of the SAT to extend these environmental considerations further to matters 
surrounding climate change.  
Doug Fisher explores the possibility of existing state planning and environmental 
legislation to address climate change is his article ‘The Statutory Relevance of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Environmental Regulation.’196 Fisher argues that in 
the absence of specific climate change legislation, the scope and language of state 
environmental planning and protection legislation will determine if GHGs are 
able to fit within existing provisions.  
The significance of Fisher’s work to this paper is that both arguments aim to 
imply an ability in existing legislation to respond to climate change. For Fisher, 
while the planning function of the legislation makes no specific reference to GHG 
emissions, their consideration can be implied through the requirement for 
consideration of environmental values. Fisher’s argument then supports the notion 
that planning and protection law in Western Australia is capable of addressing 
climate change matters, due to the required consideration of environmental values.  
                                                
196 Doug Fisher, ‘The Statutory Relevance of Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Environmental 
Regulation’ (2007) 24 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 210. 
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This paper further builds upon this notion, arguing that the SAT’s inclusion of 
environmental consideration evidences their ability to develop the law, an 
essential feature in the context of this paper and an approach to climate change.  
The SAT and its predecessor, the Town Planning Appeal Tribunal (‘TPAT’) have 
developed a body of decisions in review proceedings which incorporate 
environmental concerns into planning decisions under the PD Act. This suggests 
that as environmental concerns are able to be considered, the PD Act can address 
issues related to climate change.  The first case to confirm the requirement of 
environmental consideration in planning disputes was JE Squarcini and Milano 
Pty Ltd v State Planning Commission.197 
The case involved a developer appealing the refusal of the TPAT to uphold a 
subdivision appeal. Central to the refusal of planning permission was concern 
over the impact the sub development would have on a wetland corridor. Relevant 
to the discussion of environmental values was the tribunal’s comments that the 
‘deleterious effect on the environment of the subdivision’ outweighed ‘the 
suitability of the land for subdivision’.  When the case reached the Supreme 
Court, the developer argued that the TPAT’s weighting of the developers 
concerns against those of public interest were an error at law and it was 
unprecedented in Western Australia for deciding a town planning case on 
conservation and environmental issues as opposed to town planning principles. 
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. In making their decision the court noted 
that the TPAT derives its authority form the wording of S 5AA of the Town 
                                                
197 Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia (1996) in BC9601331 Act No. 32 of 1978 
Section 3. 
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Planning And Development Act 1928 (WA). This section is the predecessor of and 
equivalent to Part 3 in the PD Act and S 5AA ss (3) relevantly provides: 
In the preparation of a Statement of planning policy the Commissions shall have 
regard to   
a) demographic, social and economic factors and influences; 
b) conservation of natural or cultural resources for social, economic, 
environmental, ecological and scientific purposes; 
c) characteristics of land; 
d) characteristics and disposition of land use; and  
e) amenity and environment. 
The consideration of these factors in planning policy closely reflects the 
consideration of ESD. Specifically, the reference to economic, social, 
environmental and ecological factors suggests that environmental considerations 
should be incorporated into decision making similar to a consideration of ESD 
under the EP Act. This suggests that consideration of climate change can be 
inferred from the legislation, particularly those referring to ESD. 
3. Ecologically Sustainable Development in Planning Policy  
Section 3 has resulted in the implementation of environmental considerations into 
policies of the Western Australian Planning Commission. The importance of the 
following decisions to the discussion of this paper is that they display an existing 
precedent from which the SAT is able to apply to climate change disputes. This is 
an important feature which the current Appeal Convenor process lacks. It is the 
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position of this paper that this precedent is essential to the ongoing management 
of climate change.  
The SAT has employed the terminology of ESD into its decisions and a good 
example of this is the case of Moore River Company Pty Ltd and WAPC.198 The 
case involved another subdivision application, this time however the proceedings 
were ‘called in’ by the Minister for Planning under what is now s 246(2)(b) of the 
PD Act. This requires the SAT to conduct a hearing and make recommendations 
to the Minister for the final decision.  
The land proposed to be to subdivide was near Moore River, a coastal settlement 
north of Perth. Among other contentions was the ‘sustainability’ of the 
development which was to follow the subdivision. In forming their view as to the 
requisite sustainability, the SAT relied upon s 241(1) of the PD Act which 
requires the tribunal consider relevant state planning policies in reaching their 
decision. 
Specifically, the tribunal relied upon the ‘State Planning Policy 3 Urban Growth 
and Settlement’, which ‘requires the integration of social, economic and 
environmental consequences of land use’.199 This definition of course reflects that 
of ‘sustainable development’ which founded the development of ESD.  
The tribunal went on to comment that sustainability and environmental 
considerations do not by themselves provide a basis for refusing the application. 
                                                
198 [2007] WASAT 98. 
199 Ibid 41.  
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However, ‘if those consideration lead to a conclusion that the concentration of 
residential developments should occur elsewhere in the region, and in a location 
where a lesser environmental impact would result, then the loss of valuable 
coastal vegetation of the site would provide a further reason for rejecting the 
proposal’.200  
Another case considering the principles of ESD is WA Development Pty Ltd and 
Western Australian Planning Commission.201 The case involved a challenge to the 
conditions of approval which required a central boundary between the proposed 
properties to be re-aligned so as to avoid harm to rare flora known as the ‘tall 
donkey orchid’. 
In response to the Applicant’s challenge on grounds of unreasonableness of the 
condition the SAT again referred to the purpose of the PD Act as set out in s 
3(1)(c) which promotes ‘the sustainable use and development of land in the State’. 
The tribunal also recognised the decision of Moore River Company discussed 
above as having acknowledged the important role planning cases play in 
facilitating sustainability, includes ecological sustainability, as an important 
objective of proper urban and regional planning.202 
The court went further to align the West Australian decision making in respect to 
ecologically sustainable development with the substantial body of jurisprudence 
emanating from the New South Wales Land and Environment Court. 203 
                                                
200 Ibid 53. 
201 [2008] WASAT 260. 
202 Ibid 12.  
203 Ibid. 
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Specifically, the tribunal relied upon the reasoning of Justice Preston in the case 
of Telstra Corporation Ltd V Hornsbury Shire Council (discussed above) as the 
foundation of ESD per the Bruntland report (also noted above). This reasoning 
was also the basis for applying the precautionary principle relating to uncertainty 
of future harm with relation to the rare flora.  
The above cases provide a strong foundation for ESD in decision making in 
Western Australia. It is the argument of this section that the ongoing development 
of jurisprudence around ESD in Western Australia is essential in responding to 
matters relating to climate change. This is a key point in support of assigning the 
appeal under the EP Act to the SAT as part of a larger approach to the ongoing 
management of climate change.  
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4. The State Administrative Tribunals’ Consideration of Climate Change in 
Planning Decisions    
The final case considered in this section is the 2014 decisions of Wattleup Road 
Development Company Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission.204 In 
that case the tribunal was required to conduct a hearing and provide advice to the 
Minister under s 246(2)(b) - the ‘call in’ provisions of the PD Act. It will be 
recalled that the ‘call in’ process involves the Minister requestion the SAT hear 
the matter and make a recommendation to him or her for consideration in making 
the final decision. The dispute related to a refusal of approval for a subdivision 
application in the area of Hammond Park.  
The relevance of the case is the SAT’s consideration of climate change as a 
ground for recommending refusal of the application. Central to the case was 
concern was that the land was located approximately 1.2 kilometres northeast of 
an area used for drying/disposing of bauxite residue resulting from alumina 
production and close to a sand quarry. The Tribunal was then required to consider 
the potential impacts of residue blown from the alumina production site to the 
land being assessed for subdivision.  
The first point of interest is the tribunal’s consideration and application of the 
precautionary principle. As noted in the case of More River above, the SAT has 
developed a body of cases applying the principle to planning disputes. In this case 
the tribunal noted that   
                                                
204 [2014] WASAT 159. 
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under the precautionary principle, it must be assumed that the threat of serious or 
irreversible environmental damage is no longer uncertain but is a reality, 
precluding subdivisions until adequate monitoring of air quality on the site 
demonstrates the acceptability of the proposal is a proportionate, appropriate and 
cost-effective measure to ensure that the incoming population will not be exposed 
to unacceptable health or amenity impacts.205 
The tribunal’s consideration of climate change in determining the adequacy of the 
applicants monitoring is then of interest, as it noted that 
the applicants' air quality monitoring could not reasonably be relied upon to 
demonstrate that the subdivisions were acceptable in relation to the health and 
amenity impacts of dust in the future, because it is unlikely that relevant conditions 
during the monitoring year are representative of the future. These relevant 
considerations were the impact of climate change on wind and rain patterns in the 
area. 
These observations coupled with the eventual recommendation to the Minister not 
to approve the decision demonstrate an ability and aptitude by the tribunal to 
address matters related to climate change in decision making. The case also 
demonstrates a considered application of the precautionary principle in relation to 
climate change and a precedent to guide future decisions.   
The fact this case was a ‘call in’ hearing compared to an ultimate decisions is also 
relevant as it outlines ability of the Minister to retain decision making control 
whilst ensuring the hearing process is conducted in a transparent manner. This is 
                                                
205 [2014] WASAT 159, 9. 
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relevant to the recommendations made below which advocate for the engagement 
of the SAT in relation the appeal under the EP Act. It is suggested that such 
appeal could operate in a similar fashion, retaining the Minister’s control whilst 
ensuring the consideration and development of matters related to climate change.  
It should also be noted this case was appealed. The applicant sought to  challenge  
the recommendations made by the tribunal on the grounds they were in not a 
‘decision’ as required by s 105 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act.206 The 
tribunal dismissed this appeal, affirming the operation of the ‘call in’ provisions 
of the PD Act and its role in assisting the decisions making process.  
  
                                                
206 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA). 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The following section will examine options for amending the right to review 
under the EP Act.  This examination will be made with consideration of what 
Brian Preston calls the ‘Desirable Dozen’, which are the key benefits Preston 
attributes to the operation of the Land and Environment Court in New South 
Wales.207   
It is acknowledged that given the State’s reliance on natural resource 
development, the government is unlikely to divest complete control of appeal to 
the SAT or a specialised environmental court. The following examination then is 
made with consideration of this limitation and arrives at final recommendation 
with consideration of both practical and theoretical merits.  
1. Option 1: Greater Procedural Guidance for the Appeal Convenor Process 
The first option considered is retaining the current Appeal Convenor model but 
providing greater procedural guidance for the process of managing appeals. This 
option is likely to be most politically palatable and is the closest suggestion to the 
current model.  
The key recommendation is greater procedural guidance being placed on the 
discretion of the Appeal Convener. These procedures could be modeled on those 
currently used by the SAT.208 This would involve a structured mediation process 
                                                
207 Brian Preston, ‘Benefits of Judicial Specialization in Environmental Law: The Land and 
Environment Court of New South Wales as a Case Study’, (2011) 29 Pace Environmental Law 
Review 396, 425. 
208 State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA). 
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that would be available to all concerned parties, including full disclosure to all 
parties of documents relied upon in the mediation process. As noted in Part II of 
this paper, the current process often entails separate meetings between the 
Convenor and parties and often creates the impression of a breach of natural 
justice.  
Preston includes the ‘facilitation of access to justice’ as one the ‘desirable dozen’, 
specifically with focus upon practices and procedures of the court or in this case 
convener.209 Preston argues that inclusive clear procedural rules facilitate access 
to justice and removes barriers to public participation.  
The importance of public participation has been advocated in Part III of this 
paper. The added scrutiny placed on decisions makers coupled with the inherent 
complexity of climate change suggest public participation is important to 
developing a response to climate change. Such as response is also consistent with 
a ‘bottom up’ approach. 
This recommendation is consistent with the arguments of Doherty who notes that 
procedural amendments to the Appeal Convenor Model would serve as a 
preliminary step in a medium to long-term approach to amending the appeal 
provisions.210 Doherty suggests also that the role of the Convenor should be 
undertaken by a retired magistrate or senior lawyer with environmental and 
planning law expertise.   
                                                
209 Preston, above n 207, 428. 
210 Doherty, above n 24, 129. 
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This argument is consistent with Preston’s second benefit of the ‘desirable dozen’ 
which is specialization. Given the polycentric nature of environmental disputes, 
Preston argues that such an appointment would ensure effectiveness and 
efficiency. He also argues that due to the ongoing professional development 
requirements on the legal profession, assigning the role to a lawyer or retired 
magistrate would develop the technical base of knowledge within the role and 
improve decision making.211  
The main weakness, of this approach however is that it does not ensure the role is 
performed with adequate independence from government. This is the fifth benefit 
discussed by Preston and one not able to be avoided in the Appeal Convenor 
model due to the Minister deciding the selectee. It is however arguable that the 
training of a senior legal practitioner or magistrate would enable their impartiality 
in the role.   
In line with this recommendation is the option of amending the Part IV process so 
as to provide greater opportunity for public comment on reports prepared by the 
EPA. By providing a draft copy of the EPA advice before its submission to the 
Minister, issues as to the content of the report can be negotiated prior to its 
finalization. This would improve public perception of this process and potentially 
reduce the number of appeals.212  
This recommendation was made by the Environmental Stakeholder Advisory 
Group in their report commissioned in 2009 to provide more effective, timely and 
                                                
211 Preston, above n 207, 425. 
212 Environmental Stakeholder Advisory Group, ‘The Appeals Process – Report to the Minister for 
Environment’, 21 September 2009, p16. 
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coordinated assessment and decision making.213  Whilst not directly related to 
reforming the appeal provisions of the EP Act, this recommendation does support 
public participation within the decisions making process and is accordingly 
supportive of the argument presented in this paper. 
 
  
                                                
213 Ibid p19.  
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2. Option 2: Assigning Responsibility to the State Administrative Tribunal 
The key benefits of assigning responsibility of appeal to the SAT are its technical 
specialty and ability to develop a body of jurisprudence from which to guide 
future decisions and decision makers. 
Specialization is one of the ‘desirable dozen’ Preston argues is important to 
addressing environmental disputes. The technical capacity of the SAT to address 
environmental and climate change issues are evidenced by the SAT decisions 
outlined in Part IV. These examples also evidence what Preston calls a ‘critical 
mass’ of cases which assist in decision making.214  
This paper presents two ‘levels’ of assigning responsibility for appeal to the SAT. 
The first is as the ultimate decisions maker with respect to merit review appeals 
under Part VII of the Act..  
Providing the SAT with ultimate decision making would resolve the conflict 
inherent in the Minister’s dual roles. This is particularly true with relation to the 
determining of appeals to the contents of the EPA report to the Minister and 
criticisms that the Minister’s final decisions operates as a ‘precursor’ to the 
decision of cabinet via the section 45 process.  
It is also then possible to assign final decisions making power to limited 
responsibilities under Part VII. Specifically, the determining of appeals to the 
contents of the EIA report is important to the argument of this paper as it is 
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suggested measure to consider GHG emissions in the EIA process are able to be 
considered here. This is consistent with the decision of Gray v Minister for 
Planning215 and while it is acknowledged that the regulatory impact of Gray has 
not resulted in the refusal of new coal mines,  the inclusion of GHG emissions as 
an environmental consideration is certainly part of the directional approach 
advocated in Part III. 
Given the history of government sovereignty with relation to large projects 
surrounding the exploitation of natural resources it is likely a more limited role 
would be palatable 
This second recommendation involves a ‘call in’ process similar to s 246 of the 
PD Act. As explained above, this process involves the SAT conducting the 
hearing and making an informed ‘decision’ as advice to the Minister who makes 
the final decision.  
Doherty argues that the inclusions of s 246 in the PD Act was the ‘first step 
towards reform of the planning system in Western Australia, which previously 
allowed appellants to elect to have appeals determined by the Planning Minister 
instead of the Town Planning Appeals Tribunal (the precursor to the SAT)’.216  
Development of a model that engages the SAT presents the important benefit of 
retaining its independence from government. While the tribunal is not technically 
a body of the judiciary, it is still preferable to the Appeal Convenor model. 
                                                
215 Gray v Minister for Planning (2006) 152 LGERA 258, 255. 
216 Doherty, n 24, 130. 
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Independence from government is one of Preston’s ‘desirable dozen’ and 
questions relating to the impartiality of the current Appeal Convenor process are a 
significant hindrance to the perception of natural justice.  
The perceived breach of natural justice is another criticism presented in Part II of 
this paper.  Hearings conducted by the SAT would enable a more inclusive and 
transparent process and also foster confidence by participants who are impacted 
by decisions. Such as process also better engages public participation and ensures 
decisions benefit from an increased level of scrutiny and local knowledge.  
In conclusion, engaging the SAT in one or both of the manners described above 
would improve decisions making without significantly reducing government 
control of the decisions making process. Assigning appeal responsibility to the 
SAT is also a comparatively simply transition compared to the establishing of a 
specialized court. The SAT’s jurisdiction already covers by more than 150 
enabling Acts including the PD Act 217 and determinations under the EP Act 
would then benefit from this broad knowledge base.  
  
                                                
217 Planning and Development Act (2005) s 246(2)(b). 
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3. Option 3: A Specialized Environmental Court  
The creation of a specialized environmental court is the ideal solution from an 
environmental regulation point of view. This would enable the full range of 
benefits Preston advocates as having resulted from the LEC’s incorporation more 
than a quarter of a century ago. Specific benefits relevant to this argument’s focus 
on climate change are as follows; 
Rationalization 
Preston uses this term to describe the centralization of jurisdiction of 
environmental matters. 218  He argues this creates economic efficiencies by 
lowering per capita transaction costs associated with disputes and encourages 
public awareness and engagement with environmental decision making.219  
This benefit is important to climate change matters as this awareness and 
authority of the court provides an important foundation for challenging and 
developing the law.  
Independence from Government  
A specialized court would achieve a stronger level of independence from the 
government compared to either of the previous suggested models due to it not 
                                                
218 Preston, above n 197, 429. 
219 Ibid. 
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being an ‘organ of the executive branch of government’220 and a ‘fundamental 
aspect of the rule of law’.221 
As discussed in Part III, the risks of climate change are often seen as remote when 
compared to concrete benefits of development. Retaining an independent body to 
determine disputes is essential then for ensuring adequate weight is attributed to 
climate change factors. This point is especially significant in the context of the 
section 45 process in Western Australia. 
The Development of Environmental Jurisprudence 
Central to the argument of this paper has been the need to facilitate the 
development of the law with relation to ESD and climate change. As noted above, 
any model dependent on the Appeal Convenor would lack this essential 
component. Preston argues that the establishment of an environmental court, with 
a centralized jurisdiction, would lead to an increased number of disputes being 
heard and an increased breadth of jurisprudence accordingly.  
The instances of climate change litigation discussed in Part IV demonstrate the 
developments achievable through engaging matters in the courts. Of note is the 
fact that both Telsta and Taralga were heard in the LEC. Also noted in Part IV is 
that the precedent set in those cases has had implications for decisions of the SAT 
here in Western Australia. These examples suggest an ability to litigate matters 
                                                
220 Preston, above n 207, 427. 
221 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Clarendon Press, 1979) 216-17. 
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related to climate change would result faster and more significant developments in 
the law with response to climate change. 
In conclusion, the benefits of a specialized court are significant however it is 
unlikely such a development would proceed in Western Australia. Further, the 
SAT is already in the process of engaging with planning disputes and is well 
positioned to assist in dealing with disputes under the EP Act.  
As noted above, the assigning of a ‘call in’ option in the Planning and 
Development Act has been strongly attributed to the SAT being afforded a more 
substantial role in determining appeals under that Act. It is then suggested that an 
incremental approach, beginning with the SAT would establish confidence in such 
a system and lead to an eventual transition in favor of the SAT gaining ultimate 
decisions making authority with regards to appeals under the EP Act. 
4. Judicial Review 
Following from the criticisms raised above, there is a substantial role in 
addressing climate change which can result from judicial review. The cases of 
Gray and Massachusetts illustrate this. Relaxing requirements around standing is 
essential to enabling cases to be heard and to develop jurisprudence accordingly.  
Legislative measures should then be taken to provide a more open right to judicial 
review. Ideally this would follow the ‘any person, without exception’ stance taken 
in New South Wales, 222  however, attaching a conditional requirement for 
                                                
222 Environmental and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) s 123. 
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participation within the consultation and decision making process would be 
adequate.  
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I. CONCLUSION 
This paper has outlined the key criticisms of the Environmental Protection Act’s 
appeal provisions and how they inhibit the ability of the Environmental Impact 
Assessment process to encompass climate change considerations. It has been 
suggested that the responsibility for hearing appeals should be partially if not 
entirely assigned to the State Administrative Tribunal. This would address many 
if not all of the criticisms identified above with minimal impact on government 
decisions making sovereignty.  
Such an approach has not been suggested as an ultimate solution, but rather a step 
in the right direction. This directional shift is consistent with key international 
literature advocating a ‘bottom up’ approach to climate change and acknowledges 
the significant challenges climate change poses to governance.  Public 
participation has been presented as an important response to meeting these 
governance challenges and ensuring adequate scrutiny is afforded to decision 
making. 
Climate change litigation has also been discussed and its role in developing 
regulatory responses both within Australia and abroad. The ability to use these 
developments to benefit Western Australia’s environmental decisions making is 
dependent on the partial, if not entire removal of responsibility in determining 
appeals under the Environmental Protection Act from the Minister to a tribunal or 
court.  
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As the State Administrative Tribunal is already hearing planning matters it has 
developed a body of jurisprudence which will allow it to develop responses to 
climate change in line with Ecologically Sustainable Development and the 
precedents of other jurisdictions 
Relaxing access to judicial review has also been suggested as another important 
step that would facilitate attempts to address climate change. The combination of 
both these steps would allow the incremental development of the law in response 
to community participation. This is in line with international literature promoting 
a ‘bottom up’ approach to climate change and the recommendations of local 
commentators with knowledge specific to Western Australia.  
In conclusion this paper has presented a number of important benefits in 
amending the appeal provisions of the Environmental Protection Act. Many of 
these benefits are not new, however all of them are required to improve 
environmental decision making meet the governance challenges of climate change 
in Western Australia. Accordingly, climate change is catalysis for reforming the 
appeal provisions of the Environmental Protection Act and enabling a meaningful 
response to climate change.     
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